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Background Over recent years, a number of policies and ﬁnancial incentives in primary care
have been proposed to tackle issues such as deprivation and health outcomes. This article
investigates the association between healthcare spending, deprivation and outcomes. It argues
that individual practice data are analysed before blanket application and acceptance that one
size ﬁts all in a local area.
Methods Financial data were analysed alongside key outcome data, including quality and
outcomes framework (QOF) indicators for a large urban primary care trust (PCT) in the
UK. The PCT had a large population and number of practices, including single-handed
practices and an average list size in excess of 5000. The PCT will remain anonymous.
Results There was no relationship between primary care investment and the practices’
deprivation score. There was a strong statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation between
QOF payments and deprivation, (correlation =0.46, p< 0.001). There were only weak links
between primary care investment and health outcomes. There was no relationship between
high emergency spending and health outcome.
Conclusions The data presented suggest that one size does not necessarily ﬁt all—in terms of
providing the appropriate incentives in primary care, nor do national incentives and policies
always have the desired effect. © 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning
and Management published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Expenditure on healthcare continues to grow, but the actual growth in real terms is
slowing to around 1% in the UK. At the same time, life expectancy in Western
Europe has increased (Mackenbach et al., 2013). Although this paper is written from
the perspective of the English health system, health is undoubtedly a challenge for all
governments. There are a number of common factors across all health services that
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245SPENDING BY PRIMARY CARE PRACTICESAmerica. More than ever, the purchasers of healthcare seek to obtain the most in
terms of healthcare beneﬁts from limited healthcare resources, especially when such
resources are stretched by growing population numbers both in the developed and in
the less developed world (United Nations Population Division, 2010).
The publically ﬁnanced UK National Health Service (NHS) is based on a strong
primary care system and relies on the primary care physician in terms of providing
healthcare and in acting as a gatekeeper for secondary care. This paper was written
using data from an English primary care trust (PCT). PCTs were the forerunner to
the present clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) in England. PCTs were responsi-
ble for managing general practice (GP) services within the area and commissioning
secondary care on their behalf. By 2006, there were 152 PCTs across England. The
new CCGs that have replaced PCTs were designed to bring healthcare closer to the
patient, empowering smaller geographical zones of GPs to provide primary care
services and commission secondary care services for their population. Although
the original plan was to have over 500 CCGs across England, the current number
stands at 211(NHS England, 2013a). These vary considerably in terms of the size
of the population they serve.
The reforms to the NHS in the government White Paper of 2010 (DH, 2010) and
the establishment of CCGs (DH, 2011) make it crucial that GPs fully understand the
relationship between their investment in healthcare and patient outcomes. To maxi-
mise investment return, a GP consortia needs to understand the relationship between
their current spending and outcomes.
Primary care is becoming an increasingly important theme across nations. It is
argued that health outcomes are better in countries with a strong primary care system
(Kringos et al., 2013). Australia published its ﬁrst national primary healthcare
strategy in 2010 (Australian Government Department of Age and Aging, 2010), with
key components including regional integration, ﬁnance and performance, better
management of chronic conditions and equity and equality. Moore (Moore et al.,
2013) argues that healthcare costs in the USA could be reduced by some 30%, and
better management of chronic diseases is one way, he states, this could be achieved.
Phillips (Phillips and Bazemore, 2010) also argued that the USA could actually re-
duce overall healthcare spending if it doubled primary care investment to 10–12%
of total healthcare spending. Rechel (Rechel and McKee, 2009) highlights the
central European nations’ efforts to strengthen primary healthcare and the special
attention they give towards emulating the British system of primary care.
Clinical commissioning groups are essentially a devolved manager of primary
care services for the central government. This theme of decentralisation is common
across the world. It is embedded in the American state system; it is central within the
Australian system, common across Europe (Hacker, 2009; Mackenbach et al., 2013),
popular in Asia (Singh, 2008) and Latin America (Bossert et al., 2003), and Pavolini
(Pavolini and Vicarelli, 2012) argues that it is the cornerstone of the Italian health
reforms. Unfortunately, decentralisation can lead to geographical inequalities
(Rechel and McKee, 2009; Gelormino et al., 2011; Pavolini and Vicarelli, 2012).
Classic investment theory dictates that the provider of healthcare—whereby we
understand provider in this case as an organisation that purchases healthcare from
secondary sources to provide for its population—CCG or PCT will be seeking to© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
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rules on this basis in terms of economic efﬁciency. In this case, this would require
the PCT or CCG to put the funds where the return is greatest in terms of healthcare
return. This may be in stark contrast to where the greatest need occurs in each of the
wards within its domain. A PCT/CCG driven by needs assessment may wish to
invest their capital somewhat differently than the NPV rule. In 2004, an allocation
formula was introduced into primary care in England and Wales, which was further
modiﬁed to enable PCTs to pay practices more or less money to correct for historical
inequities and address areas of need. (DH, 2002)
In the last 10 years, a number of policies have been introduced to incentivise the
primary care purchasing function to achieve efﬁciency and to improve health
outcomes for the population in England and Wales. These include the recent White
Paper (DH, 2010); the Darzi report ‘High Quality Care For All’ (DH, 2008); quality,
innovation, productivity and prevention (Appleby et al., 2010); quality and out-
comes framework (QOF) (DH, 2004a); payment by results (PbR) (DH, 2004b) and
the new general medical services (GMS) contract (DH, 2003a, 2003b), as well as
the implementation of numerous local initiatives. The question is do these initiatives
work and are primary care practices achieving outcomes from these initiatives that
policy makers desired? The aforementioned policies clearly show that repeated gov-
ernments are wedded to quality and efﬁciency making a difference to the health of
the nation. The White Paper promised to increase healthcare spending and ensure
it provides equality to all; Darzi emphasised high quality locally led care; quality, in-
novation, productivity and prevention also talks of quality of care whilst seeking to
re-invest the planned efﬁciency savings back into patient care; payment by results,
by removing price competition and gaming, hopes to drive each hospital towards ef-
ﬁciency and move towards products differentiated in terms of their quality, and the
GMS contract puts emphasis on choice, productivity and now public health (NHS
England, 2013b).
The QOF is used as a key indicator in this work. The QOF, introduced in 2004, is
a set of key quality indicators of health and disease management in areas such as
coronary heart disease (CHD) and diabetes. The primary care practice is incentivised
to deliver healthcare in these areas and rewarded ﬁnancially for achieving targets—
for example, obtaining blood pressure and cholesterol within deﬁned limits for those
at risk. The more the practice achieves the set targets, the greater the ﬁnancial reward
for the practice. Although some targets have been in place since the inception of
QOF, others change depending on current health needs and priorities. The targets
chosen for this analysis have remained important throughout. QOF seeks to achieve
positive health outcomes whilst at the same time providing incentives and income
for the primary care practice. In a review article in 2010, Steel and Willems (Steel
and Willems, 2010) felt that the evidence base surrounding the impact of QOF
was sketchy, and further research was necessary to inform changes in QOF to
achieve equity and improvements in health. They argue, ‘Most studies show little
relationship between QOF achievement and health service activity or health
outcomes.’ This work aims to further investigate this relationship.
In this paper, we follow the same themes exploring whereby quality as measured
by the QOF indicators, improves when linked to the amount of healthcare© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
247SPENDING BY PRIMARY CARE PRACTICESinvestment received per person. The aforementioned is a gross oversimpliﬁcation of
the health service policy. Set amidst all these national policies however, it is easy to
see why a CCG would think that investment and achievement of QOF targets and the
linked payments should improve the health of their population.
This paper used detailed data from a PCT to examine some commonly held beliefs
about primary care spending, and whether it resulted in the outcomes decision
makers desired. It poses some beliefs held by the PCT and policy makers and seeks
to establish whether they are true.
The commonly held beliefs under examination are
• practices with a high level of deprivation receive a high investment in primary care,
• high QOF payments or high investment payments relate to good outcomes and
• high emergency care spending and secondary care spending indicate poor patient
outcomes
The analysis presented in this paper is based on detailed data from one ﬁnancial
year from a single, anonymous PCT. Although audited accounts and public health
indicators are freely available, the level of data used in this analysis by primary care
practice would not be available to the general public and was used with permission
from the PCT. The ﬁndings of this research work are potentially controversial and
may be detrimental if taken out of context for any single employee of the PCT in
question. Therefore to preserve anonymity of all the employed PCT staff and to
enable full and frank publication of the full result set, with the consent of the PCT’s
staff and senior management, the identity of the PCT will not be published. The mes-
sages are key for any CCG (DH, 2011) trying to understand its relationship between
primary care spending and outcomes. The issues will be shared by many primary care
commissioners, and therefore it is important that such ﬁndings should be in the public
domain to assist the thinking and decision making processes of commissioners.METHODS
The population is urban and deprived with an average index of multiple deprivation
score in 2007 of around 50. It has in the order of 100 practices including a number of
single-handed practices. The PCT has a large population of around half a million and
a large number of practices with an average list size in excess of 5000. The analysis
was undertaken using data for ﬁnancial year 2007/2008. The period was chosen for
the quality of the data in that ﬁnancial year and its completeness. The data and
analysis examined investment from the PCT and allowances for QOF payments.
Each practice’s spending and outcomes were considered.
Detailed ﬁnancial data for 2007/2008 were obtained for each GP practice in the
PCT. Data were obtained on the QOF payments, the quality payments made to
GPs for achieving certain standards of care across a range of areas. In addition,
practice investment was collected, this is the payment received by the primary care
practice from the PCT. It is based on a range of factors including list size, practice
population, deprivation and historical spending patterns. Practice investment did
not include QOF payments; hence, double counting was avoided.© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
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emergency, daycase, elective and non-elective inpatients and new and follow-up
outpatient appointments, which allows us to split spending into elective and emer-
gency secondary care spending. Pharmacy expenditure was also obtained. Elements
of expenditure for each practice were divided by the list size, to calculate average
expenditures per person, so that comparisons between practices could be made.
Practice characteristics and ﬁnancial data were linked to a number of quality indi-
cators from the QOF standards that reﬂected both the high disease mortality and
morbidity areas for the PCT and within the UK. The QOF indicators chosen came
from the following diseases: diabetes, CHD, stroke and chronic obstructive pulmo-
nary disease (COPD). These indicators were chosen on discussion with specialists
in public health as representing a number of key indicators and disease areas. Their
validity was further discussed with ofﬁcers from the ﬁnance department. The follow-
ing lists the QOF targets chosen for detailed analysis.
• Stroke—the percentage of people with BP 150/90 or below.
• CHD—the percentage of people with total cholesterol 5 or below.
• Diabetes—the percentage of people with HbA1c 7.5 or below.
• Emergency admissions—exacerbation of COPD per 1000 practice population
(DH 2004a)
Many of the indicators are useful for a number of diseases and do not relate solely
to a single disease. Together, these were used to assess whether investment was
linked to the quality of service provided by the GP practices. The paper explores
the evidence around investment and outcome and examines whether some
commonly held beliefs (outlined in the previous texts) surrounding investment and
outcome hold.
All practices in the PCT were included in the analysis; hence, any outliers were
included. This was a naturalistic data-set, and the analysis aimed to present the
PCT with ﬁndings that wholly reﬂected the real world situation. Sufﬁcient time
had elapsed from the submission of returns such that missing data did not occur
because of time lags. Data were analysed using the SPSS statistical package.RESULTS
The following sections present the results under the headings of each of the three
hypotheses under investigation, to determine whether the evidence supported the
assertions that were made.
Practices with a high level of deprivation receive a high investment in primary care
In this analysis alone, the Primary Care Trust’s Medical Services practices were
excluded. These were salaried practices with staff directly employed by the PCT,
rather than the usual model of independent GP practices. They are as such a
manufactured subgroup speciﬁcally created by the PCT to attract GPs to areas of
high deprivation.© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
249SPENDING BY PRIMARY CARE PRACTICESThe belief that high deprivation is associated with high investment did not hold
true as illustrated by Figure 1.
There is no discernable relationship between practice investment per person and
the practices’ deprivation score. Practices with high and low investment had high
deprivation scores (correlation = 0.16, p = 0.13).
Although no relationship was found between investment and deprivation, there is
a strong statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation between QOF payments per
person and deprivation, (correlation =0.46, p< 0.001). This showed that the more
deprived the location, the less QOF money the practice received per person. It there-
fore implies that practices in the most deprived locations were least able to reach
their QOF targets and as such yield good patient outcomes. This ﬁnding is perhaps
not surprising and represents an area PCTs may wish to address.Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 Score
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Figure 1. The relationship between average investment per person (£) and deprivationHigh quality and outcomes framework payments or high investment payments relate
to good outcomes
There were only a few weak links between primary care investment and speciﬁc
outcomes. Although we did not examine every single outcome or QOF target, the
key QOF targets and high disease prevalence groups were examined as deﬁned by
the PCT. Weak positive relationships were found between primary care investment
and CHD, the percentage of people with total cholesterol of 5mmol/l or below,
and diabetes, the percentage of people with HbA1c of 7.5 or below. An example
can be found in Figure 2.© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
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Figure 2. The relationship between average investment per person (£) and the QOF indicator
CHD; the percentage of people with total cholesterol 5mmol/l or below
250 M. JAMES AND E. STOKESWeak positive relationships were also found between QOF payments and CHD,
the percentage of people with total cholesterol of 5mmol/l or below, and stroke,
the percentage of people with BP 150/90 or below. A weak negative correlation
was found between QOF payments and emergency admissions for exacerbations
of COPD per 1000 population. Hence practices receiving more QOF money per
person were also those with fewer emergency admissions for COPD; this implies
that better control in primary care was preventing unnecessary accident and
emergency admissions.
There is therefore a trend towards QOF payments being related to better patient
outcomes, but this relationship is only weak and requires further monitoring. The
clear relationship that was anticipated between QOF payments and outcomes did
not exist. All these ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution as there are a number
of outliers that could have inﬂuenced the ﬁndings.
High emergency care spending and secondary care spending indicate poor patient
outcomes
A commonly held belief is that high emergency care spending is synonymous with
poor population health and health outcome. The analysis showed that this relation-
ship did not hold. In one of the indicators, diabetes: the percentage of people with
HbA1c 7.5 or below, there was a weak negative relationship with emergency
secondary care spend (correlation =0.31, p = 0.002). This showed that the better
controlled the diabetes, the less was spent on emergency care. It was encouraging
to observe this ﬁnding. This is shown in Figure 3.© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
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Figure 3. The relationship between average emergency secondary care spend per person (£)
and the QOF indicator diabetes; the percentage of people with HbA1c 7.5 or below
251SPENDING BY PRIMARY CARE PRACTICESSurprisingly and in conﬂict with the ﬁnding in the previous texts, there was a weak
positive relationship between emergency secondary care spending and emergency admi-
ssions for exacerbations of COPD per 1000 population (correlation= 0.50, p< 0.001).
There was no relationship between emergency secondary care spending and CHD, the
percentage of people with total cholesterol of 5mmol/l or below, or stroke, the percentage
of people with BP 150/90 or below.
It is worth exploring further the proportion of spending on emergency care
within secondary care spending in general. Approximately 62% of secondary care
spending was on emergency care, and 38% on elective care. There was strong
statistically signiﬁcant positive correlation between elective and emergency
secondary care spend (correlation = 0.51, p< 0.001). This indicates that those
practices that spend highly on emergency secondary care also spend highly on
elective care. Similarly, there was strong statistically signiﬁcant positive correla-
tion between pharmacy spend and total secondary care spend (correlation = 0.54,
p< 0.001); as well as between pharmacy spend and both elective and emergency
secondary care spend. In terms of pharmacy and secondary care spend; therefore,
those who spend highly in one area tend to spend highly in other areas. Hence
the assumption that spending on emergency care may be a result of
underspending on elective or pharmaceutical care does not hold true. Similarly,
no relationship was found between primary care spending and secondary care
spending. Those practices that have a high primary care spend, for example,
did not have compensatory low spend in secondary care.© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
252 M. JAMES AND E. STOKESDISCUSSION
As health service managers, decision makers and policy makers, the incentive is to
deliver health policy based on what seem to be logical premises and indeed the com-
monly held beliefs listed at the start of this paper; however, this may be a dangerous
pathway to take when the data do not support such policies. The evidence presented
in this paper suggests that none of the commonly held beliefs under discussion could
be supported by the data.
Although the study was conducted in a large urban environment, the ﬁndings and
the commonly held beliefs could apply to a large number of areas across the UK and
beyond. Firstly, the study has a primary focus on investment and outcome. Many
CCGs may assume that increasing investment will likely bring about improvements
in outcome. The relationship shown here was not a simple one and signalled it is
important to compare theory with evidence in practice. Whatever the geographical
location, policy should be based on data and evidence. Although the ﬁndings of this
work may be less applicable to remote rural settings, much of the UK, Europe and
indeed the developing world is becoming increasingly urbanised, and the ﬁndings
of this work could be easily transferable to a large number of city settings and urban
conurbations.
Discussing investment in healthcare or the public sector is complicated and
fraught with difﬁculties. The select committee of 2006 (House of Commons Health
Committee, 2006) argues that three key difﬁculties are:
• the funding formula itself,
• poor central management and
• poor local management.
It is not surprising therefore that the relationship between investment and outcome
seems less than perfect. Although this paper makes no judgement on the quality of
management either centrally or locally, it does examine how data around funding
translates to outcomes.
Richardson (Richardson, 1998) argues in the case of public sector investment that
the NPV rule may not apply and other conditions such as politics may be equally
important drivers. Equally, Arrow and Lind (Arrow and Lind, 1970) argue that
public investment should carry a different discount rate to private investment. It
follows therefore that public investment may not follow the same rules as private
investment and may not be judged in the same way.
The relationship between purchasers and providers is blurred yet further in
healthcare by the agency relationship. Stalebrink and Sacco (Stalebrink and Sacco,
2006) highlight the problems of dealing with this agency relationship and the inﬂu-
ence of institutional characteristics. In terms of primary care commissioning by a
PCT or CCG, this is indeed a double agency relationship whereby the PCT invests
in a primary care practice, which in turn passes on this contract relationship to a
secondary care organisation. Baxter argues (Baxter et al., 2008) that it is this
‘principle agent’ relationship that is important and drivers within an organisation
such as the clinicians within primary care, or a secondary care hospital, can be just
as important in determining whether a national policy works, as the policy itself.© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
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and ideas rolling forward without conscious decision making and hospitals driving
the priorities and decisions made by CCGs. With the advent of CCGs, at least one
element of this complex agency relationship is removed. Hence the contractual
relationship between PCT and GPs is removed as the GPs, in terms of the CCGs,
become direct commissioners.
The results did not support the hypothesis that practices with a high level of
deprivation receive a high investment in primary care. Tudor Hart in his seminal
paper in the Lancet (Tudor Hart, 1971) argued that ‘the availability of good medical
or social care tends to vary inversely with the need of the population served.’ The
hypothesis tested in this research does not look directly at availability but uses proxy
measures such as access to investment and ability to meet QOF targets. In terms of
investment, the results show that there is no relationship between the practices’ level
of investment and deprivation. Although not directly supporting Tudor Hart’s asser-
tion, it does illustrate that areas of most need do not receive the extra investment that
may enable them to improve their populations’ health. Tudor Hart argues that ‘The
force that creates and maintains the inverse care law is the operation of the market.’
Hence Tudor Hart himself indicates that the problem is not just about access but the
existing capital stock of the area such as poor premises and equipment and a shortage
of staff. Capital as such is an area that could be addressed by further investment.
Asthana in the Select Committee Report on Health Care Deﬁcits (House of
Commons Health Committee, 2006) argued that basing resource allocation on
current access is ﬂawed. The baseline level of access she argued may be too high
or too low originally for the disease pool it represents. Similarly, she claimed that
there was an inverse relationship between deﬁcits and high levels of deprivation.
Asthana argued that the likelihood of deﬁcits in afﬂuent areas suggested that either
wealthier groups use healthcare services more than is necessary, or that inadequate
levels of funding are provided for these areas. Although some may argue that
afﬂuent areas tend to be in deﬁcit, because wealthier people demand more healthcare
services, Asthana found that the average service use in deprived areas is signiﬁcantly
greater than that in less deprived areas, for a range of measures.
Watt in his 2002 follow-up article (Watt, 2002) suggests that even if investment to
less deprived practices increases, the problem itself may not diminish. He uses the anal-
ogy of a swimming pool. ‘Family doctors in afﬂuent areas are standing in the shallow
end with their feet on the bottom, whereas those in deprived areas are treading water in
the deep end, receiving deprivation payments for their trouble.’Hence they may indeed
be receiving investment, but this investment is dwarfed by the underlying problem of
the disease pool. Interestingly, Watt moves away from the traditional public health
focus of concentrating on hard to evaluate or unevaluated interventions but instead
argues for better targeted delivery of clinical interventions, with proven effectiveness.
Such interventions, for example bariatric surgery, may not be sufﬁciently reﬂected by
the achievement of QOF targets and subsequent payments.
Asthana argues that it cannot be assumed that increasing investment alone will
improve outcomes, and that need is not merely related to deprivation, but to the
age proﬁle of the population (Asthana and Gibson, 2008). Ageing populations,
even in afﬂuent areas, may have poor access to care relative to need. Using the© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
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Hence, the argument is that not only is outcome linked to deprivation but also to
demography.
This limited evidence is supported by early ﬁndings from Ashworth (Ashworth
et al., 2007) and Sahota (Sahota et al., 2008) in Walsall. The ﬁndings presented here
and the work of Ashworth (Ashworth et al., 2007) and Sahota (Sahota et al., 2008)
would suggest that there is not a simple relationship between the level of deprivation
within a practice and the amount of investment it receives. It would appear that
insufﬁcient investment is detrimental to a practice achieving its QOF targets. This
result is supported by the ﬁndings from Ashworth and Armstrong (Ashworth and
Armstrong, 2006).
The evidence that high QOF payments or high investment payments bring about
good patient outcomes is somewhat weak. It is supported in this work by the ﬁndings
relating to CHD and diabetes and in terms of the reduced admissions to secondary
care for COPD. The ﬁndings regarding COPD of practices receiving more QOF
money per person, were also those with fewer emergency admissions for COPD,
are consistent with the ﬁndings of Downing (Downing et al., 2007). Downing also
showed that fewer emergency admissions were related to achieving QOF targets in
this area. This message is further echoed in Cooper’s work on waiting lists (Cooper
et al., 2009) ‘between 1997 and 2007, waiting times for elective knee replacements,
hip replacements, and cataract repairs dropped signiﬁcantly and equity, measured as
the variation in waiting times according to socioeconomic status, improved.’ This
gives some degree of hope that government targets and incentives can move not only
efﬁciency in the right direction but at the same time improve equity.
It can be argued that other factors such as practice size inﬂuence patient outcome
more directly than QOF payments; however, a paper by Tahrani (Tahrani et al.,
2008) showed that the differences observed between patient outcome and practice
size disappeared following the introduction of QOF. Morgan, in early work on prac-
tice payments (Morgan and Beerstecher, 2006), found that smaller investments per
patient were related to better quality scores than higher investments per patient. This
evidence would point to the importance of historical artefacts and the time they take
to work through the system (Asthana, 2011).
The evidence in this work regarding the QOF and its link to outcome and invest-
ment is limited. This is in line with a thought piece produced by Gillam (Gillam and
Steel, 2013). He questions whether QOF payments produce better outcomes or better
recording. Better outcomes he indicates may still not be achieved by practices
because of factors beyond the control of the QOF, such as access to services. Others
argue that the evidence in favour of the QOF is limited. Sohhet (Shohet et al., 2007)
shows a modest rise in cost effectiveness and a fall in mortality and hospital admis-
sions as a result of the QOF, Fleetcroft (Fleetcroft et al., 2010) models the gains and
shows evidence that they only occur in the ﬁrst year of QOF and not subsequent
years. Dusheiko (Dusheiko et al., 2011) found that better primary care management
(as measured by QOF) was associated with reduced hospital costs for only one of 10
chronic diseases studied - stroke. By contrast, we found no association between
emergency secondary care spending and stroke, the percentage of people with BP
150/90 or below. Walker (Walker et al., 2010) shows that although some QOF© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2014; 29: 244–259.
255SPENDING BY PRIMARY CARE PRACTICESpayments are cost effective, there is no relationship between the size of payment and
the size of the health gain. In short, as to whether the QOF has improved, the population
health Gillam (Gillam and Steel, 2013) concludes ‘we don’t know,’ and recommends
that the proportion of GP income commanded by the QOF be reduced.
Throughout the last decades of health service policy, there has been a growing
tension between equity and efﬁciency. Sassi and Le Grand (Sassi and Le Grand,
2001) argued that there was a ‘failure to strike an acceptable balance between the
policy goals of equity and efﬁciency when these conﬂict.’ It could be argued that
the policies examined here focus on efﬁciency, whilst forgetting the underlying
problem that equity and deprivation can play in the ability to achieve the goal of
efﬁciency, or indeed the CCGs desire to pursue the goal of efﬁciency over equity.
Oliver (Oliver et al., 2002) in a comment in The Lancet argues that it is not only
national policy that is important in addressing inequality but that local policy must
also play a role. This paper illustrates the use of national policy whilst allowing
for local policy adjustments in investment. The effects however of both policies
appeared to be somewhat random and inconsistent.
The results showed that high spending in one area, for example, pharmacy, tended
to be associated with high spending in another area such as elective care. Other than
in COPD, no evidence could be found that high primary care spending resulted in
less emergency care spending. This relationship requires further investigation. It
implies that potentially where low spending occurs in primary care, then demand
for emergency care is also low, a substitution relationship is therefore not present
but the services are instead complementary. Where for example people utilise
considerable primary care resources, the implication is again spend on pharmacy
and emergency care is also high, again implying a complementary relationship
between pharmaceutical care, primary care, secondary care and emergency care.
Others have also found this complementary relationship. In a study of ﬁve developed
countries (including the UK and USA), Wilton (Wilton and Smith, 2002) found that
growth in expenditure per capita on community physician services was signiﬁcantly
positively correlated with growth in expenditure per capita on inpatient care. This is
also consistent with work on areas of high utilisation and where patients frequently
attend for care. Heywood (Heywood et al., 1998) found that the top 3% of frequent
attenders consume ﬁve times as many prescriptions and hospital contacts compared
with less frequent attenders. This would be consistent with the assertion that high
consumption in one area, is accompanied by high consumption in another area, in
this case of medical goods and services.
The data presented here showed that there is wide variation in terms of practice
spend and outcome. This ﬁnding is supported in the work of Wennberg (Wennberg,
2011), who reported widespread variation between practices. It would seem that the
variation could as likely be an artefact of historical spending and individual practice
characteristics as of any patient level characteristics. Gray in the NHS Atlas of
Variation (Gray and Da Silva, 2010) argues that it is imperative that such unneces-
sary variation be tackled.
A limitation of this work is that only cross-sectional data were analysed. With data
collected at one point in time, it is not possible to draw inferences on causality and
determine if an association is found between two variables—which is the cause and© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
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were changing over time, and whether for example the inﬂuence of historical
payments was reducing over time or not.
Although the new GMS contract of 2004 was supposed to improve local resource
allocation, it would seem from evidence presented here that there is not a direct link
between the local allocation of resources, investment and outcome. This situation
could be made worse by the advent of CCGs. The population served by a CCGs,
is much smaller than a PCT and may be small enough to bring about ﬁnancial insta-
bility (Asthana and Gibson, 2011) as population numbers in a CCG are not large
enough to enable the risk pooling required to allow such a system to operate efﬁ-
ciently (Asthana et al., 2011). The analysis by Rhys (Rhys et al., 2010) suggested
that changes to the resource allocation system did not improve equitable monetary
allocation for equal need; he further highlighted that current funding depends more
on historical funding patterns than speciﬁc changes to the capitation formula. Rhys
argued that a needs-based formula is preferable over Carr-Hill’s utilisation-based
formula. Determining how to allocate healthcare resources is a problem that is not
going away. The NHS Commissioning Board has for now rejected the introduction
of the new allocation formula designed and commissioned from the Nufﬁeld Trust
that shows accurate person-based data in predicting costs (Lacobucci, 2012). The is-
sue seems to be that equity and need may suffer. Ironically, this effects either end of
the spectrum—the wealthy that does not access health services because of private
care and the poorer groups who delay. It could be argued that such concerns are mir-
rored by the ﬁndings of this paper.
Buyx (Buyx et al., 2011) suggests an alternative to the current allocation and
recording system by maintaining that it is not rationing by cost effectiveness that
should be the driver, but clinical effectiveness, at the same time excluding those
procedures that yield minimal effective care, perhaps as such reducing variation,
tackling efﬁciency rather than equality. However, in the work presented here, there
are only weak positive relationships between QOF payments and outcomes, which
would lessen the argument for allocation by effectiveness alone.
Hawkes (Hawkes, 2009) commenting on the proposed changes from the
Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation (ACRA), using work from Brunel
University reported that it is impossible to combine need and inequality. The
new resource allocation formula is to be used in parallel with a separate formula
for health inequalities using disability adjusted life years. Although the north of
the country gained from this complex model, the model he reported may be ﬂawed
in that the weight attached to inequality is set by politicians and the rate of moving
to the need and equality target is undetermined. Hawkes is clear however that
resource allocation is a jungle ‘man-eating statisticians, steeped in the lore of
the jungle and ready to pounce at the sound of a breaking twig. Wizards uttering
incantations dance around a cooking pot stocked with tasty data, brewing up
heaven knows what. The light is dim, and understanding is even dimmer.’
(Hawkes, 2009).
There are indications that there is a growing desire to allocate resources sys-
tematically in a data-driven environment (Smith, 2008), and credible progress
has been made in the use of data and funding formulae. Better local knowledge© 2013 The Authors. International Journal of Health Planning and Management
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reduction in inequalities (Pavolini and Vicarelli, 2012). The appropriate use of
data is something that would be echoed in the works of this paper and the
recognition that not only do different localities require different treatment in
resource allocation, but also do different wards within those localities. The
importance of managing decentralised systems is one that is as important for
less-developed countries as the developed world in terms of national growth
and a fair political regime.CONCLUSIONS
The key message from this work is that the ﬁndings of the analysis did not support
the commonly held beliefs. The analysis presented suggests that investment in
primary care and practice spend is not closely related to the outcomes of the service
provided or any of the practice characteristics explored. Investment appears to
relate most closely to historical payments. A key message to PCTs and commis-
sioning bodies may be that ﬁnancial spending on primary care alone does not
improve patient outcomes. The picture here presented is a useful starting point
for commissioners to undertake further analysis and highlights some potentially
fruitful avenues for further research. Any commissioner wishing to understand its
investment budget and how this relates to patient outcome would be well advised
to take the ﬁrst exploratory steps towards understanding their spending, leastwise
not to make non-evidence-based assumptions around spending and outcome
but to examine the real outcomes in practice. It is likely that ﬁnancial incentives
need to relate more closely to individual practice characteristics and patterns of
behaviour. Gray (Gray and Da Silva, 2010) stresses that awareness is the ﬁrst
step towards addressing variations in practice; the work presented here echoes
such sentiments and exhorts PCTs and their successors to determine where
variation lies without making assumptions around its cause and the policy solu-
tions. Health systems (Rechel and McKee, 2009) need to respond to the needs
of their populations.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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